• Three desiderata for models of representation are outlined.
Some Desiderata for Models of Representation
What characteristics should an acceptable model of representation have? What characteristics should fail a model on offer if that model cannot satisfy them? I will outline three such desiderata, and make use of primarily the third in surveying some representational models in the current literature. As will be evident, this third criterionsystem or organism detectable error -rather trivially refutes every model of representation on offer in the contemporary literature. It is striking, and perhaps even 1 With apologies to Tim van Gelder.
Mark H. Bickhard 17 Memorial Dr E Lehigh University Bethlehem, PA 18015 USA mhb0@lehigh.edu somewhat scandalous, that these refutations are so simple, and yet so overlooked or ignored.
Emergence
Representation has to have emerged: it didn't exist 14 billion years ago and it does now.
Any model of representation that makes this impossible is thereby refuted; any model that fails to account for this is thereby at least incomplete.
It is also worth noting that pushing the problem of emergence onto evolution, such as in contemporary nativisms, does not resolve the issue (Allen & Bickhard, 2013; Fodor, 1981b) . If basic representational atoms must be innate because the only way in which new representations can be constructed is as combinations of already available representations, then any such in-principle restrictions apply to evolution just as much as to learning and development, and emergent representation is not possible. Such models are thereby refuted.
On the other hand, if evolution can generate emergent representation, then there is no model or explanation on offer of how evolution can accomplish this, but learning and development cannot. That is, if emergent representation is possible, such as in evolution, then why not in individual learning and development?
Error
A second desideratum is to be able to account for the possibility of representational error:
being about something involves the possibilities of being true or false about that something.
Attempting to account for the possibility of representational error became a small in-house industry when it was realized that information semantics models seemed to make error not possible. If the crucial informational (causal, nomological) relationship that constitutes representation exists, then the representation exists and is correct; if the crucial relationship does not exist then the representation does not exist; and there is no third possibility for accounting for the representation existing but being false. There have been several attempts to provide such an account in the last decades, but, arguably, none of them succeed (Bickhard, 2009a) .
Furthermore, even if they did succeed on their own terms, they address the problem of error only from the perspective of an external observer on the organism and its environment -they address how such an observer might determine that something in the organism that is 'supposed' to represent X is in error because what is in fact in the environment is (a) Y. This restriction to and reliance on an external observer violates the third desideratum:
Organism Detectable Error
Representation must be more than an ascription by an observer -representation must be representation for an organism. A limitation to ascription fails to account for the representations of the ascripter -the observer. Furthermore, representation for an organism, e.g., prior to the evolution of any 'observers', must be capable not only of being true or false, but of being true or false from the organism's perspective, and, still further, at least in principle, capable of being detected as true or false by that organism.
2 2 'at least in principle' because there may be species that make minimal use of such error detection possibilities. But there are species that make major use, and, therefore, any model that makes such organism detectable error impossible in principle cannot be correct. On the other hand, even bacteria seem to correct swimming down a sugar gradient by ceasing to swim and tumbling for a moment (Campbell, 1974) . This might be considered to be a more complex desideratum, one that can and should be postponed till simpler issues concerning representation are solved or resolved.
But this will not do: if organism detectable error is not possible, then error guided action and learning are not possible.
3 Error guided action and learning occur, therefore any model that renders this impossible is thereby refuted. Any model that cannot address this is thereby at least incomplete.
2 Representation Still Resists Naturalism I will argue that none of the major models of representation available today satisfy these desiderata, with a focus on the third: organism detectable error.
Fodor
Fodor advocates a version of information semantics. Representation is constituted in nomological relations between activities in the nervous system and phenomena in the environment, e.g., 'transduction' of light in the retina into encodings of properties of the light (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1981; Fodor, 1990a Fodor, , 1990b Fodor, , 1990c . This encounters the problem of the possibility of error, which Fodor proposes can be handled via a relationship of asymmetric dependency from false activations of a representation to true or correct activations. The idea is that a COW representation, for example, might be falsely activated by a horse on a dark night in way that is dependent on the fact that cows will activate COW, but that cows can activate COW without there being any dependency on horses being able to activate it. There is an unreciprocated dependency from the possibility of false activations to the possibility of true activations.
This does capture something of the intuition of the possibility of error: it is dependent on -parasitic on -the possibility of success. But it is not specific to representation at all: a 'poison' molecule might activate a neural receptor in a way that is parasitic on the possibilities of the correct neurotransmitter activating that receptor, but there is no representation here (Levine & Bickhard, 1999) .
Most fundamentally, however, the model fails the criterion of organism detectable error (Bickhard, 2009a 
Information Processing
An information processing framework is a general form of information semantics that dominates, for example, research in psychology, especially cognitive psychology. 4 This is not to argue that correlational information is not useful or necessary: it is both. See Bickhard (2000b, in preparation -b, -c) for discussions.
Millikan
One central reason that information semantics models have difficulty in accounting for the possibility of error is that, in such models, representational relationships only have two parts: the representation itself -presumably some condition or process in the organism -and the represented. With only two parts, if the relationship exists, then the represented exists, and so the representation is true.
Millikan's model has a property that is crucial for accounting for the possibility of error: it is a three part model (Millikan, 1984 (Millikan, , 1993 . In particular, it models the existence of content -a specification of what the representation is supposed to represent -in addition to representation and represented. This aspect or component of representation makes it possible for the content to misapply to the represented, and, therefore, for the instance of the representation to be false for the represented.
Models of content as a third aspect of representation have predecessors in Frege's
Sinn (Beaney, 1997) and the Brentano-Twardowski notion of content (Jacquette, 2004a (Jacquette, , 2004b Poli, 1996; Smith, 1994) . But these models don't really model content; instead they point out the functional necessity for content, and leave its nature unaddressed.
Content is the normative aspect of representation -that which generates the normative values of truth and falsity; that which the representation is supposed to represent -and the long standing difficulties in accounting for any kind of normativity within a naturalistic framework have worked against models making attempts to account for content. Witness, for example, the pretzel twists in Fodor's attempt within a nominally two part information semantics.
Millikan, in contrast, has a genuine three part model, and, therefore -insofar as the model works in other ways -it has no in-principle problem accounting for the possibility of representational error. There are, however, other problems.
In this model, a representation of X is something that has the function of indicating X. Something having such a function, in turn, is constituted in ancestral organs or processes in the species having been selected during evolution for having such indications (or for producing things that have such indications). So, function is constituted in having the right evolutionary selection history, and representation is a kind
Consequently, what is supposed to be indicated by a given representation -the content of that representation -is constituted in having an appropriate evolutionary history. Content, then, is distinct from what is being represented -this is a three part model -and representational error seems easily possible.
But, no organism has access to its own evolutionary history, and, therefore, no organism has access to its own content. So, no organism can compare its own content to what it is attempting to represent in order to determine error or lack of error.
Finally, to compare one's own content, even if there were access to it, requires independent epistemic access to what is being represented -stepping outside of oneself -and that is impossible. Organism detectable error, therefore, is impossible, and consequently also error guided action and learning. The model, thus, is refuted. 5 , 6
Dretske
Dretske's model is also an etiological model -a model in which the crucial normativity is constituted in having the right origins, the right history -like Millikan's (Dretske, 1988) , except that the required history is a learning history rather than 7 an evolutionary history. Nevertheless, the same problems arise: There is no access to one's own content, and, therefore no way to compare that content to the world being represented. And, in what should by now be familiar, even if the organism did have access to its own content, it could not compare to the world because it does not have independent epistemic access to the world. It cannot step outside of itself.
Organism detectable error, therefore, is not possible, and the model is refuted. Cummins (1996) also has a three part model, and, thus, can seemingly account for the possibility of error. He distinguishes between representation and target of the representation, thus error seems possible in a lack of match between representation and target.
Cummins
But, in this model, representation is constituted in structural isomorphism between representation and represented. Isomorphism, however, is transitive and reflexive, and representation is neither. Isomorphism is also relative to unbounded ranges of ways to determine what structure is in real systems; in general, many structures can be defined in any given real system, and Cummins does not specify how the 'correct' structure is to be identified. Furthermore, Cummins' notion of target is relative to the normative phenomena of purpose or goal, and there is no account of normativity (Bickhard, 2009a) .
So, in this model too, there is no way to access content (structure) and, as usual, no way to compare with the represented -the target -even if content could be accessed. Organism detectable error is not possible, and the model is refuted.
Symbol System Hypothesis
In the original symbol system hypothesis (Newell, 1980; Newell & Simon, 1972 , 1975 , representation is simply designation or pointing. But there is no model of how designation could possibly work outside of the 'pointers to memory locations' model inside of a computer (Bickhard & Terveen, 1995) . Such pointers are functional, not epistemic, and do not address representation at all.
Later, we find a footnote that dismisses problems about representation with the claim that it is constituted in structural isomorphism (Vera & Simon, 1993 , 1994 . The symbol system hypothesis, thus, does not take the problem of representation seriously; doesn't attempt to address the problem of representational error; and has no way to address comparison of representation with represented. Organism-or system-detectable error is impossible, and the model is refuted.
Connectionism
Connectionist representations are defined in terms of (trained) correspondences with what is represented. This is a version of information semantics, except that the correspondences (covariations) are trained rather than being 'transduced'.
8
In spite of the advantages of trainability, distributed activation vectors, and so on, therefore, as a model of representation, connectionism has all of the problems of information semantics. Error is determined by the 'trainer', using specialized input for error, 9 or from the perspective of the designer or user or observer. Organism detectable error is not possible, and the model is refuted. Clark and Toribio (1995) argued that some situations are 'representation hungry' -they require tracking. Keeping track of a predator behind a rock, for example. Thus, so the argument goes, even dynamic systems require representation-as-tracking.
Dynamic Systems -Tracking
But tracking as constituting representation requires an observer to determine if the tracking is in error. This does not violate Clark's stance (nor Dretske's) because they 8 But transduction, in one of Fodor's incarnations (1986) , is 'just' generation of representation without inference. So connectionist systems are trained transducers in this sense. 9 And even this input is not an error input from the perspective of the system. It is simply a special input that, by design, evokes special processes (e.g., back propagation). See Bickhard & Terveen (1995) . 10 There is a framework, derived from multiple sources, but including in particular machine learning, that discusses internal error and error minimization that would prima facie seem to be a counter-example to this claim. But this too is 'error' only from the external perspective of the observer, not from the perspective of the system: these models are intrinsically non-normative. See McDermott (1981) for a discussion of similar misguidance from mislabeling. This general framework of action oriented predictive processing (Clark, 2013) has multiple complexities, but they do not alter the basic point concerning representation and representational error. The framework is discussed further later in the text, and in more detail elsewhere (Bickhard, in preparation -a, -b, -c; Bickhard & Terveen, 1995) .
advocate a notion of representation as constituted in being attributed by such an observer.
Representation, in such a model, is not a dynamic reality, but, rather, an attribution involved in an observer's explanation of how and why the organism is doing whatever it is doing. Among other problems, such observer dependency fails to account for the representations of that observer.
More generally, however, tracking either occurs or not. If so, then the trackingrepresentation exists and is correct. If not, the representation relationship does not exist.
There is no account of representation existing but being in error, except from the perspective of an observer who provides the normative content of what the tracking 'representation' is supposed to represent.
Organism detectable error, thus, is impossible, and the model is refuted.
Dynamic Systems -No Representation
Some dynamic systems advocates (including the article from which the title of this paper is derived: van Gelder, 1995) have argued that representation is an unnecessary and misleading concept -that the fundamental modeling task is to get the dynamics right, and that this can be done without any representation at all (Port & van Gelder, 1995) .
The model that I will outline is a version of a dynamic systems model, but I will argue that complex agents require that certain functions be performed, and that performing these functions requires processing that yields emergent truth value -thus representation. Representation in the sense of truth valued processes or conditions, therefore, will exist in complex agents whether or not the word 'representation' is used.
So, avoiding the term 'representation' simply makes talking about the dynamics of real systems much more difficult. It doesn't change the dynamics of those systems at all.
The Radical Skeptical Argument
Before turning to that model, I would like to point out an indication of the depth of the problem of organism detectable error, and, perhaps, a reason why it is so universally ignored: the problem of organism detectable error is the focus of the radical skeptical argument. The conclusions of many skeptical arguments are some kind of fallibilism, and I will not address those. But the radical skeptical argument focuses on our inability to step outside of ourselves to compare our representations with the world to see if they are correct. So, the multiple and ubiquitous failures to model organism detectable error are part of the long history of failures to resolve radical skepticism (Popkin 2003; Popkin and Stroll 2002; Rescher 1980; Weintraub 1997 ).
This history of failures is reason enough, for some, to ignore radical skepticism: it cannot be solved or resolved, so it should simply be ignored. But, error guided action and learning do occur, so organism detectable error occurs, so there has to be something wrong with the radical skeptical argument, and representation, including derivative error guided action and learning, cannot be correctly modeled without correcting whatever has produced such a history of failure.
Radical skepticism is not just an armchair philosophical problem. It manifests a fundamental error in the framing of the problem of the nature of representation that has persisted for millennia. A complex agent must select and guide its interactions. To do so, it must have some sort of functional indications of what interactions are possible in its current situation, so that it can select among them (Bickhard & Richie, 1983; Bickhard, 2009a Bickhard, , 2009b . It cannot successfully engage in an interaction that is not supported in the current environment. Content, in this model, is implicit, not explicit as in encoding models. It is constituted in the implicitly defined, implicitly presupposed conditions in the 11 I will not address some crucial aspects of the model, such as that of the emergence of normative function in a way that is not subject to the problems of etiological models of function. See Bickhard (1993 Bickhard ( , 2009a . 12 For early presentations of the model, see Bickhard (1978 Bickhard ( , 1980a Bickhard ( /1973 Bickhard ( , 1980b Bickhard ( , 1980c Bickhard ( , 1982 . For more developed versions, see Bickhard (1993 Bickhard ( , 2005 Bickhard ( , 2009a Bickhard ( , 2009b . 13 If 'indications' of interactive potentialities must themselves be represented, then the model is circular. That such a circularity is not forced is demonstrated by the fact that such indications could be realized as pointers, which are strictly machine-theoretic functional. For a model of how the brain realizes such anticipation (not by pointers), see Bickhard (2011, in preparation-a, in preparation-b, in preparation-c, in preparation-d) .
environment that would support the anticipation if they were to obtain. It is that the environment manifests sufficient such supporting conditions that is implicitly predicated of that environment it anticipating that an interaction would flow within anticipated bounds in that environment (Bickhard, 2009a (Bickhard, , 2009b .
Interactivist Representation
Representation, thus, emerges in future oriented, pragmatist, anticipations of possible interactions, not in past oriented 'spectator models' (Dewey, 1960; Tiles, 1990) attempting to look backwards in time down the stream of inputs.
Indications of potential interactions are primitive loci of emergent truth value, but they do not look much like canonical forms of representation. So here is an outline of some of the resources available in such a model for more complex representation. Consider now a small toy block, for an infant or toddler. The toddler can engage in many interactions, such as manipulations, visual scans, dropping, chewing, and so on.
More Complex Representation
The block affords a special kind of subweb of interaction indications with two special properties: 1) any interaction possibility in the subweb, such as a particular visual scan, is reachable from every other possibility, such as a different visual scan, via some intermediary interaction, such as rotating the block -so the subweb is internally completely reachable, and 2) that subweb remains invariant under many things that the toddler can do and under many things that can happen in the environment, such as throwing the block, putting it into the toy box, leaving it on the floor and leaving the room, and so on. It does not, however, remain invariant if the block is, for example, burned or crushed.
From the epistemic perspective of the toddler, the block is whatever affords such a special subweb of potential interactions. 14 This is essentially Piaget's model of the representation of small manipulable objects, translated into interactivist terms (Piaget, 1954) . More generally, the interactivist model has resources for addressing complex representation.
5 Two Comparisons
I would like to address two contemporary approaches in a little more detail in order to demonstrate that the above critique still applies to these frameworks. The two approaches are those of 'enactivism' and a family of related kind of models that are designated variously 'the predictive brain', 'the Bayesian brain', and related names.
14 The notion of affordance is used here with deliberate allusion to Gibson and contemporary ecological psychology research (e.g., Gibson, 1966 Gibson, , 1977 Gibson, , 1979 O'Regan & Noë, 2001) . For further discussion of Gibson's model, see (Bickhard, 2005, in preparation-c; Bickhard & Richie, 1983) . 15 There is much more to be addressed, such as abstractions (e.g., numbers), language, and so on, but the model has resources for addressing those too (Bickhard & Richie, 1983; Bickhard & Terveen, 1995; Bickhard, 2009a, in preparation-c) .
Enactivism
Enactivism, descended from Maturana and Varela's autopoietic model (Maturana & Varela, 1980 Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991) , incorporates aspects of dynamic systems frameworks, ecological psychology, and embodied cognition. It shares several intuitions with the interactivist model, perhaps the most basic being that cognition is inherent in the nature of living beings (Maturana & Varela, 1980; Varela, 1997; Weber & Varela, 2002) . Compare 'knowing as explicated above is an intrinsic characteristic of any living system ' Bickhard (1973, p. 8; also Bickhard, 1980a, p. 68) .
With regard to representation and cognition more broadly, however, there are problems that trace back to the basic definition of autopoiesis. In particular, autopoiesis focuses on an internal perspective on a system, emphasizing the (re-)production of the components of that system. This kind of process will only occur in far from thermodynamic equilibrium conditions, but there is no mention of such conditions (till Di Paolo, 2005) , nor any mention of any kind of essential relation to the system's environment. With no intrinsic relations to an environment, there is no basis in the framework for modeling representational or cognitive relations with that environment.
This problem is manifest in the basic discussion (Maturana & Varela, 1980) .
Relations between a system and its environment are discerned by an observer of the system in its environment (though how the observer's cognitions are to be modeled is not clear). 16 But later in the book (roughly pages 38-40), an internal recursive process somehow becomes an internal observer of the internal system, and magically thereby becomes an observer of the system's relations with its environment -with the perspective of an external observer. This non-sequitur is deep in the conceptual framework of autopoiesis and enactivism. Recognition of some of these basic limitations of the framework has been slow (Varela, 1997; Weber & Varela, 2002; but see Bickhard, 2000a, in preparation-c; Christiansen & Hooker 2000; Di Paolo, 2005; Moreno, Etxeberria & Umerez, 2008) .
With respect to the basic issue of representation, enactivism has no model.
Enactivist discussions often allude to cognition in some broad sense, but there is no attempt to account for representational truth value or representational error, and there cannot be any successful such attempt so long as the basic autopoietic definitional framework is used. Consequently, there is no, and can be no, model of organism detectable error, thus error guided behavior and error guided learning. 
Action-Oriented Predictive Processing 18
The predictive processing framework proposes that the brain attempts to generate predictions -or expectations or anticipations -of inputs. The 'action orientation' derives from recognition that 'predictive' signals might, instead of being matched against incoming actual signals to determine if the predictions hold, be directed at muscles, thus influencing the environment from which the inputs originate, and, thus, potentially 17 Di Paolo (2005) argues that autopoiesis cannot in itself address adaptivity, and, thus, must be enhanced. One version of his notion of adaptivity is learning ('plastic adaptivity'). This, I would agree, is precisely the right direction (see also Moreno, Etxeberria & Umerez, 2008) . But I would also argue that adaptivity should not be simply added on top of autopoiesis as standardly defined: the definition has to be altered so as to focus on the system's maintenance of the far from equilibrium conditions that are necessary to the system's existence -(recursive) self-maintenance of its conditions of existence (see Bickhard, 1993 Bickhard, , 2009a . 18 A term adopted from Clark (2013) .
inducing the 'expected' inputs instead of just passively receiving them (Clark, 2013; Friston & Stephan, 2007; MacKay, 1956 MacKay, , 1969 Powers, 1973) .
These are computational models, 19 and the differences between actual inputs and 'predicted' inputs are called 'error', so it might seem that models in this family would be an exception to the claim that no models on offer in the current literature can account for error and for system detectable error.
On the other hand, these models are modern day variants of classical sensory encoding empiricisms -approaches that originated millennia ago -and these kinds of models haven't succeeded yet. Perhaps the proper conclusion is that it is a fundamentally flawed approach, including in its contemporary action oriented predictive processing guise. In fact, as outlined above, there are in-principle reasons, in addition to historical reasons, to conclude that encodingism in all of its variants is at root incoherent: among other problems, it cannot resolve the radical skeptical problem. And there are alternatives: pragmatist oriented action models, such as the interactivist model.
Problems with Predictive Encoding
First, note that the 'errors' in such models are differences between 'predicted' or 'expected' inputs and actual inputs. They are errors about the world only insofar as the inputs constitute the ground for all representations of that world -as aggregates or organizations of input sensations, for example. 20 Second, such inputs have to be construed as Fodor transductions (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1981; Bickhard & Richie, 1983) in order to ground the computational inferences that are based on them -representational sensations have to be somehow generated from strictly factual, causal inputs. This presumed interface from fact to representation, of course, has defeated every attempt to account for it throughout history.
It is the fundamental problem of sensory encodings.
Third, there is in fact no normativity at all in these models, except in the views of the designers of the models. They are strictly causal and factual, and they tend to settle in conditions in which differences between generated signals and input signals are minimized. Such differences are 'errors' only from an observer perspective, just as the inputs per se are 'representations' only from an observer perspective.
The interactivist model, however, claims to model the emergence of representational truth value in terms of anticipations, and these predictive encoding models also involve what are called 'predictions', 'expectations', and sometimes even 'anticipations' -so perhaps they can model representation in the same way -?
Despite the use of the same or similar terms, however, there are fundamental differences.
Insofar as there are anticipations in predictive encoding models, they are anticipations of inputs. All representation, all prediction, all anticipation, ultimately is defined relative to the global input-output interface. In contrast, in the interactive model, anticipation is anticipation of the flow of interactive processes. These flows will be influenced by inputs, and outputs, but it is not the inputs or outputs per se that are anticipated. It is the anticipating that is representational -truth valued -not the inputs.
over inputs, and it has to be assumed that our world is actually represented solely in terms of such parameters.
Relatedly, in predictive encoding models, the representational connection with the world is mediated strictly by sensory encodings -predictive encoding models are incarnations of semantic information sensory empiricism -encountering all of the problems of encodingism. In the interactivist model, the representational relationship is via interactive implicit definitional presuppositions about that world. This ground of future-oriented dynamic implicit definition instead of direct explicit input-encoding is historically novel, and is what transcends classical problems.
So, in spite of using terms such as 'error', predictive encoding models are no exception to the conclusion that there are no major models on offer that can account for the possibility of organism detectable representational error.
Enactivism and Predictive Processing
Fundamentally, there is no representational-transduction interface between the mind and the world, or the brain and the world: 21 the sensory encoding framework is fundamentally flawed, and the complexities and sophistications of predictive models does nothing to alter that. Conversely, neither the rejection of representation by some enactivists, nor the observer idealism of the autopoietic model, nor the closed system perspective of the autopoietic model can frame an acceptable model of representation and the possibility of organism detectable representational error.
Neither enactivism nor predictive encoding frameworks constitute or provide exceptions to the general critiques offered above.
6 So, What Could Cognition Be?
Cognition is a representational dynamics, in which representation is constituted in pragmatic future oriented indications of potentialities for interaction in complex interactive agents. This is a dynamic model, but it goes beyond dynamic systems per se, e.g., in requiring normative indications of interaction possibilities (Bickhard, 2007) .
Interactive representation is emergent in particular kinds of dynamic system processes, and, thus, is emergent whenever those kinds of system dynamics occur -it satisfies the criterion of emergence.
Interactive representation is anticipatory, and the anticipations of interactive potentialities may be true or may be false -the model has no difficulty accounting for the possibility of representational error.
Interactive representational anticipations are not only capable of being false, engaging such a false anticipation will functionally encounter the failure of the anticipation in the internal processes of the organism -thus organism detectable error is possible, and, therefore, so are error guided interaction and learning.
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